Once again we will reveal some hidden gem of corruption as according to the record placed before the courts in Karachi through FIR No. 19/2023 registered by the Federal Investigation Agency’s Anti-Corruption Circle reveals a picture of systemic corruption within Pakistan Customs that goes far beyond the arrest of two officers at an airport.
According to the FIR and subsequent interim charge sheet,
the case originates from source information developed during Enquiry No.
49/2023, suggesting that an organized mechanism for the collection and
distribution of bribe money, commonly referred to as speed money, was operating
across multiple customs check posts around Karachi. These check posts,
including Mochko, Hamdard, Northern Bypass, Super Highway, and Ghaggar Phatak,
were allegedly being used as toll points where smugglers paid regular amounts
to ensure uninterrupted movement of smuggled goods from border areas of
Balochistan into Karachi.
The narrative of the case formally begins on 13 July 2023,
when a FIA team intercepted two serving customs officials, Tariq Mehmood and
Yawar Abbas, at Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, as they were preparing
to board a domestic flight to Islamabad. The FIR states that both men were
posted in the Anti-Smuggling Directorate and were found in possession of
official identity cards, confirming their serving status. Upon search of their
official vehicle parked at the airport, the FIA recovered a large amount of
cash and foreign currency, amounting to over Rs. 5.4 million in Pakistani
rupees along with US dollars and UAE dirhams. This recovery, documented in the
FIR, is described as the immediate trigger that exposed a much larger network.
According to the FIR, the accused officers failed to provide
any genuine explanation for carrying such a large amount of cash and allegedly
made voluntary disclosures during interrogation. They reportedly admitted that
the recovered money represented speed money collected from customs check posts
and that such collections were not isolated or personal acts but part of an
organized system.
The FIR explicitly states that the money was meant to be
distributed among various customs officials, including officers at senior
levels such as collectors, additional collectors, deputy collectors,
superintendents, and preventive staff. The alleged monthly collection from the
mentioned check posts was estimated in the FIR to range between Rs. 40 to 50
million, with additional amounts generated specifically through the
facilitation of betel nut, or chhalia, smuggling.
What makes the case particularly significant is that the FIR
and interim challan do not confine allegations to lower or mid-level field
officers. The documents explicitly name senior officers of Pakistan Customs,
including collectors who were serving or had served in influential positions
such as Director Anti-Smuggling, Director Afghan Transit Trade, Collector
Enforcement, and Collector Export at Karachi. The FIR narrates that the accused
officers disclosed a pattern where successive heads of the Anti-Smuggling
Directorate allegedly continued the same facilitation arrangements with
smugglers, providing what is described as an “umbrella” of protection in return
for regular payments. The names mentioned include Saqif Saeed, Usman Bajwa, and
Amir Thaeem, each alleged to have held key positions during different periods
while the smuggling and collection network continued to operate.
The FIR further alleges that during March 2023 alone,
approximately Rs. 160 million was collected as speed money from various customs
check posts, to be distributed among officers providing protection and
facilitation. While such figures are yet to be adjudicated by the court, their
inclusion in the FIR indicates the scale of the alleged corruption and the
confidence of the investigators in the statements recorded during inquiry and
interrogation. The documents suggest that the network was not limited to
customs officers alone but extended to private individuals involved in the
smuggling, processing, and distribution of goods, particularly betel nuts,
which have long been recognized as a high-value smuggling commodity.
One of the private actors named in the FIR is Imran Noorani,
described as running a betel nut smuggling network from Balochistan to Karachi
and operating a processing facility under the name M/s Sunny Products in the
Shershah Industrial Area. The FIR alleges that smuggled chhalia was brought
into Karachi with the active facilitation of customs officers and then processed
and distributed through factories and traders listed in the challan. A long
list of private individuals, traders, factory owners, and facilitators appears
in the interim charge sheet, indicating what investigators describe as a supply
chain that depended on official connivance at multiple levels.
Beyond the specific allegations of bribery and facilitation
of smuggling, the most troubling aspect highlighted by the Team of The INQUIRER
is the issue of accountability, or the lack of it, within the customs
administration. Despite the registration of an FIR, the nomination of 17
customs officers, and the detailed attribution of roles in the challan, it is
an admitted position, as reflected according to the source of The INQUIRER,
that no departmental proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules have
been initiated against any of the nominated officers. There has been no
suspension, no order of inquiry, no departmental charge sheet, and no statement
of allegations issued, even though the case is pending before the customs court
in Karachi as Case No. 153/2023.
This absence of departmental action stands in stark contrast
to the provisions of the E&D Rules 2020, particularly Rule 5, which
explicitly empowers and, in certain circumstances, obliges the competent authority
to place a civil servant under suspension or send them on leave once criminal
proceedings are initiated, especially to prevent the accused from influencing
investigations or witnesses.
The issue of selective accountability emerges as a central
theme in the narrative. While lower-level officers are often swiftly suspended
or subjected to departmental action upon mere allegations ,The perception,
reinforced by the absence of suspensions or inquiries, is that there exists an
informal protection mechanism for senior customs officers, particularly those
from the CSP cadre, which undermines both public confidence and the stated
anti-corruption policies of the state.
Another serious concern is the potential for influencing
witnesses and tampering with proceedings. When officers accused of corruption
continue to serve, especially in enforcement or intelligence-related roles,
they retain access to networks, records, and subordinate staff. . The very
rationale behind suspension under the E&D Rules is to prevent such
outcomes, yet the failure to invoke these provisions raises questions about
intent and institutional will.
The inclusion of law enforcement officers from other
departments, such as police officials and officers of other federal services,
in the interim challan further complicates the picture. It suggests that the
alleged corruption network may not have been confined to a single department
but may have relied on inter-departmental coordination or at least
acquiescence. While these allegations remain to be tested in court, their
presence in the challan underscores the breadth of the investigation and the
seriousness of the claims.
Furthermore, that the ample coverage of the scam exists
online, yet a crucial aspect remains largely unaddressed in public discourse:
the continued service of the accused officers. Media reports may focus on
sensational arrests or large recoveries of cash, but the quieter administrative
decisions, or lack thereof, often escape scrutiny. The failure to initiate
departmental proceedings becomes normalized, even though it directly
contradicts established rules and past practices in cases involving less
influential officers.
The anticipated response, or lack of response, from the
Federal Board of Revenue’s spokesperson is also part of this narrative. As there
appears to be no clear justification offered for why departmental proceedings
have not been initiated. Any explanation would have to reconcile the explicit
provisions of the E&D Rules with the inaction observed in this case. The
silence or evasiveness of official spokespeople, if it continues, may further
reinforce perceptions of selective accountability and institutional capture.
At its core, the case described in the FIR and challan
raises fundamental questions about governance, rule of law, and equality before
the law within Pakistan’s revenue and enforcement institutions. If officers
accused of facilitating smuggling worth hundreds of millions of rupees can
continue to serve without interruption, what message does this send to honest
officers within the department, to traders and smugglers, and to the public at
large? The apparent disconnect between criminal prosecution and administrative
accountability weakens deterrence and incentivizes misconduct.
It is important to emphasize that the allegations detailed
in the FIR and challan are yet to be finally adjudicated by the courts, and the
accused are entitled to due process and the presumption of innocence. However,
departmental proceedings are not contingent upon conviction; they are designed
to address conduct unbecoming of a civil servant and to protect the integrity
of the service during the pendency of serious charges. The refusal or failure
to even initiate such proceedings, despite detailed allegations and ongoing
trial, is therefore not a legal necessity but an administrative choice.
The case will proceed slowly through the courts,
adjournments will accumulate, witnesses will lose interest or face pressure,
and by the time a judgment is delivered, many of the accused officers will have
retired. Even a conviction at that stage will have limited practical impact, as
retirement benefits are rarely clawed back and the deterrent effect is minimal.
This cycle, repeated over decades, erodes institutional credibility and
perpetuates corruption.
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